Four important ways of religious education in the field of beliefs are inferred in this article through the NATURE of religion in the Holy Quran. We have examined two categories of “NATURE of religion” and “methods of religious education” for this purpose. All verses including the root of “د ـ ی ـ ن” (religion) have been investigated in order to properly understand the NATURE of religion in the Holy Quran. Then, we have benefited from the inference method to find the ways of religious education in the Holy Quran. In the inferential method, we have reached the “conclusion”, which is the method of religious education by using two premises, “normative” and “realistic”. The solutions of the Holy Quran to achieve the methods of religious education are explained in the following. For example, using the Scriptures directly to know the right actions is one of the solutions of the Holy Quran to reach the way of believing in the punishment of deeds. The achievement of religious education methods through discovering the NATURE of religion and explaining the purpose of education on the one hand and using the inferential method as a research method on the other hand is one of the innovations of this research. The achievements of this paper can be used to provide an educational theoretical model for formal and public education system.

This paper examines the work of Immanuel Kant in the light of a new theory on the NATURE of truth, knowledge and falsehood (the Inversion Theory of Truth). Kant’s idea that knowledge could be absolutely certain, and that its truth must correspond with reality, is discredited by a dissection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth. This examination of the NATURE of truth, as well as knowledge and falsehood, is conducted with reference to Sir Karl Popper’s writings on regulative ideas, the criterion of demarcation and the principle of falsifiability. It is argued that if truth is to be regarded as certain, it should be used to describe objects and events in the objective (noumenal) state, and that subjective knowledge must contain (and is improved by) falsehood. Perceptions and knowledge are obtained by the biological and evolutionary process of Active Subjectivism. Ideas we have knowledge of can be metaphysical or scientific, according to Popper’s Criterion of Demarcation. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” claim that our intellect imposes absolutely true LAWS on NATURE could not allow for the possibility that ideas might be constructed from fallible perceptions, and hence that all knowledge is uncertain. Instead, he developed a Critique of Practical Reason in which religion, though not provable through logical reasoning, could be proved by our innate moral sense, giving us a Categorical Imperative that could lead to perverse results. By rejecting the absolute certainty of a priori knowledge, and admitting a degree of essential falsehood, we arrive at a more reasonable grounding for moral behavior.

Classical theism holds that God rules the world not only indirectly, by the natural LAWS established with creation, but through actions or direct interventions that interfere with natural processes and human actions. These direct interventions are usually called miracles. Modern Western philosophy, at least starting from Spinoza and Hume, has defined miracles as “violations of the LAWS of NATURE” and criticized them on this ground. Actually, if God is the author of the natural LAWS, it seems contradictory that he violates them performing miracles. In the last decades, analytical philosophy of religion developed a considerable discussion on this topic. This debate has seen, on the one hand, those, like N. Smart and R. Swinburne, who defend the definition of miracle as a violation of natural LAWS, and those, like K. Ward, R. Larmer, and D. Corner, who reject it and sustain alternative definitions of miracle. In my article, I refer to this debate with the purpose of showing that the notion of miracle as a violation of the natural law is a coherent one from a theistic point of view.

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenestein has some remarks on the NATURE of LAWS of NATURE. His main concern is to connect genuine LAWS of NATURE with logic. To illuminate and explain this connection, we suggest a distinction between two kinds of LAWS (inspired by Wittgenestein himself). On the one hand, general LAWS of NATURE (e.g. law of conservation) restrict applicability of other LAWS of NATURE. According to Wittgenstein, although we do not know whether these LAWS are true or not a priori, we know their logical forms in advance, and this fact is enough to guarantee a connection between these LAWS and logic (we know logical truths in advance as well). On the other hand, first order LAWS of NATURE (e.g. Newton's LAWS) have limited scope of applicability. Wittgenstein treats these LAWS as logical patterns with the ability to classify propositions about the world. As long as we take first order LAWS as nets with this ability, and dismiss their factual content, the connection between them and logic is obvious again. Having made this distinction, we go to consider the situation of two principles: induction and causation. It will be showed that according to Wittgenestein, there is no connection between these two and logic, and therefore these so-called LAWS are not among genuine ones. The next step is to compare Wittgenestein's account of LAWS with Poincare's conventionalism. Despite some similarities, it will be argued that the former cannot be taken seriously by a scientist or a philosopher of science who takes experimentation important in science.

The LAWS of NATURE appear to have a central role in scientific practice, so it is an important issue for philosophers of science to examine different views regarding the law of NATURE. There are many theses developed in this regard which the famed Humean Supervenienceis reviewed in this paper. Tooley and Carroll's thought experiments are explained and their considered conclusions are judged. Moreover, the governing intuition about the natural LAWS is inspected and the Rumean approach is vindicated.

We always have a close interaction with systematic NATURE. Most of our behaviors, planning’s, predictions, as well as our ideas and beliefs are due to the fact that we consider NATURE as controlled by the LAWS. Since the LAWS of NATURE are the main keys of human sciences, analysis and explanation of these LAWS were a part of the research of many great philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Ibn Sina, Hume, Mullah Sadra and Kant. In this paper, while referring to some theories about the LAWS of NATURE, the author deals particularly with Hume’s standpoint, which is well-known as the viewpoint of “orderliness”; and then, he criticized it through distinguishing between perpetual propositions and necessary propositions.

The idea of “creatio ex nihilo” entered the arena of natural science with the advent of modern cosmology in the mid-twentieth century. This idea, that is, the creation of the universe out of nothing, seems to be a consequence of the widely accepted Big Bang Theory which implies the temporal finitude of the world. In order to avoid the theological and metaphysical implications of such an idea, some scenarios and scientific models have been proposed. According to one of the scenarios, the creation ex nihilo of the world is a causal physical phenomenon, and, hence, can be explained scientifically by appealing to the LAWS of NATURE. In this essay, I aim to discuss and criticize this idea. To fulfill this aim, in the introduction some achievements of modern cosmology will be very briefly introduced. In the next three sections, the notions of existence and nothingness, creation, scientific explanation, and singularity will be explored. It will be shown that what philosophers mean by these notions isradically different fromthe naïve ideas of some scientists. Hence, applying these notions to physical models of the origin of the universe is completely misleading. This work concludes that no scientific explanation appealing to the LAWS of NATURE can possibly explainthe creation of the universe out of nothing.

The method of metaphysics: Metaphysics is empirical but depends not, like the sciences, on recondite experience but on close attention to aspects of everyday experience we ordinarily scarcely notice. "Real" is a broader concept than "exists" (which applies only to particulars) and also applies to phenomena, kinds, and LAWS, which are real, but not, of course, existent entities. But "there are real kinds, LAWS, etc." doesn't imply that all the kinds and LAWS we believe are real, are. I call my approach "Innocent Realism" because--though it's certainly not naive--it requires attending to experience, so far as possible, without substantial preconceptions. There is one real world, enormously varied but also integrated. It includes physical stuff, kinds, LAWS, etc. and, here on earth, a vast array of human artifacts, physical, social, intellectual, and imaginative, all intimately interconnected. All this requires human mindedness (a better word than "mind" because it doesn't suggest that human mentality is an organ like the heart or the liver). Rather, it's a complex congeries of dispositions and abilities: to understand even such a relatively simple thing as what's involved in someone's believing something, we need to take account of the person's dispositions to behavior, verbal and otherwise; to the neurophysiological realizations of these dispositions; and to their connections to the world and to words in the person's linguistic community--this last requiring other people's words-world connection. "Virtual" reality is just one more computer artifact, clever, no doubt, but not metaphysically startling. It's oversold, but this is advertising hype, not serious metaphysics.

NATURE has aesthetics of its own, what can provoke the human mind into better recognizing the concept of beauty via mental perception. As such, human mind can interact with the nonverbal expressions of NATURE only to better his/her primitive aesthetic knowledge and reach a more novel recognition of aestheticism via the practice of interpretative deduction. This article has been the result of a series of discussions and dialogues between the authors on the NATURE of aesthetic geotouring and exploring the natural phenomena based on the Dialectical Method of Socrates and modelled after the Platonic dialogues. The outcome of this dialectic study brings to light the fact that touring in NATURE through providing the due opportunity for mental perception of aesthetic phenomena can provide a clearer definition of ‘beauty’ in its rich variety. Aesthetic search as such will culminate in forming a more illuminated mental concept of beauty in mind, what can influence human rationale for aesthetic judgment and enrich even more the texture of human aesthetic creation. Such aesthetico-interpretative endeavor might lead to a higher potential for creating more original works of literature and art and culminate in a better judgment about such aesthetic creations.